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On tû-tû
My goal in this short paper is to argue that so-called intermediary concepts 
play an essential role in organizing and generating legal knowledge. My point of 
departure is a reconstruction and a critique of Alf Ross’s analysis of such con-
cepts. His goal was to argue that there exist concepts in the law which have no 
semantic reference, yet it is reasonable to use them as they perform some useful 
function regarding the presentation of legal rules. I believe that Ross is wrong 
on both counts: his argument to the effect that intermediary concepts have no 
reference is flawed, and his characterization of the functions such concepts play 
in the law is too limiting. 
1 ROss’s aRgument
In his famous paper of 1951 Alf Ross takes us to the imaginary Noîsulli 
Islands in the South Pacific to meet the Noît-cif tribe.1 In the language of Noît-
cif there exits the concept of ‘tû-tû’. Whoever encounters his mother-in-law, or 
kills a totem animal or has eaten the food prepared for the chief, becomes tû-tû. 
Whoever is tû-tû, is subject to a ceremony of purification. Thus, Ross observes 
that the following statements are true in the language of Noît-cif:
(1) If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is tû-tû.
(2) If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is tû-tû.
(3) If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is tû-tû.
(4) If a person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification.
Ross further asks, what is tû-tû. And he replies that, it is “of course nothing 
at all, a word devoid of any meaning whatever. (…) The talk about tû-tû is pure 
nonsense.”2 The word has no semantic reference, although the expressions in 
which it appears are meaningful. In order to show that it is so, Ross observes 
that3 
the pronouncement of the assertion ‘x is tû-tû’ clearly occurs in definite semantic con-
nection with a complex situation of which two parts can be distinguished:
1 The paper appeared first in Danish. Below, I quote the English version, Ross 1957. 
2 Ross 1957: 812.
3 Ross 1957: 814.
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(i) The state of affairs in which x has either eaten of the chief ’s food or has killed a 
totem animal or has encountered his mother-in-law, etc. This state of affairs will here-
inafter be referred to as affairs1.
(ii) The state of affairs in which the valid norm which requires ceremonial purification 
is applicable to x, more precisely stated as the state of affairs in which if x does not 
submit himself to the ceremony he will in all probability be exposed to a given reac-
tion on the part of the community. This state of affairs will hereinafter be referred to 
as affairs2.
In order to show that ‘tû-tû’ has no semantic reference, Ross considers the 
propositions (3) and (4):
(3) If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is tû-tû.
(4) If a person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification.
There are two ways of pinpointing the semantic reference of ‘tû-tû’ – it may 
either be identified with affairs1 or affairs2. The natural move would be to sub-
stitute ‘tû-tû’ with affairs2 in the proposition (3), and with affairs1 in the propo-
sition (4). But this solution is unsatisfactory, since in such a case ‘tû-tû’ would 
have two different meanings, and the argument based on (3) and (4) to the ef-
fect that a person who has eaten the food prepared for the chief is subject to 
the ceremony of purification would not be logically valid due to the fallacy of 
quattuor terminorum. The second option is to understand ‘tû-tû’ as referring 
uniquely to affairs1; this, however, will not do, since it would make the proposi-
tion (3) analytically void:
(3)* If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, the state of af-
fairs exists where x has either eaten of the chief ’s food or has killed a 
totem animal or has encountered his mother-in-law, etc.
Similarly, if one claimed that the meaning of ‘tû-tû’ is affairs2, the proposi-
tion (4) would become analytically void. Therefore, Ross concludes, ‘tû-tû’ has 
no semantic reference. 
At the same time, Ross claims that the use of such semantically empty con-
cepts may be useful as an efficient method of the presentation of (legal) rules. 
Let us assume that in the culture of Noît-cif being ‘tû-tû’ not only requires to 
undergo the process of purification, but also makes the person unfit for combat 
as well as for hunting. Thus, in addition to the proposition (1) – (4), the follow-
ing two rules are valid:
(5) If a person x is tû-tû, x is unfit for combat.
(6) If a person x is tû-tû, x is unfit for hunting.
Now, the absence of the concept of ‘tû-tû’ would make (the relevant part of) 
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(1)a If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is s subject to the 
ceremony of purification.
(1)b If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is unfit for combat.
(1)c If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is unfit for hunting.
(2)a If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is s subject to the ceremony of 
purification.
(2)b If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is unfit for combat.
(2)c If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is unfit for hunting.
(3)a If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is s subject to 
the ceremony of purification.
(3)b If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is unfit for com-
bat.
(3)c If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is unfit for 
hunting.
In this way, six proposition become nine different propositions. In the ac-
tual, more complex legal systems, the utilization of such ‘semantically empty’ 
concepts as ‘tû-tû’ may be even more advantageous. For example, Ross consid-
ers the concept of ownership. In any legal system there are many ways of acquir-
ing ownership (purchase, inheritance, prescription, execution, winning a bet, 
exchange, earning, etc.) as well as many consequences of being an owner (the 
right to use, sell, consume, alter, share, exchange, transfer, give away, destroy, 
etc.). The concept of ownership – or any other such intermediate link between 
different states of affairs – is simply an efficient way of structuring and present-
ing legal norms. However, it changes little when it comes to identifying the se-
mantic reference of the term ‘ownership’ – it is “a word devoid of any meaning 
whatever” just like ‘tû-tû’, ‘right’, ‘duty’ or ‘claim’. 
2 eveRy cOncept is tû-tûesque
I would like to argue in this section that Ross’s argument to the effect that 
‘tû-tû’ is semantically void, is flawed. Let us consider one of the concepts Ross 
thinks to have semantic reference, e.g. ‘totem animal’. Let us further assume that 
– in the culture of Noît-cif – the following propositions are true:
(7) If x is a lion, then x is a totem animal.
(8) If x is a tiger, then x is a totem animal.
(9) If x is an albino animal, then x is a totem animal.
(10) If x is a totem animal, then x should be worshiped by sacrifice.
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Now, Ross’s strategy for establishing the ‘semantic emptiness’ of ‘tû-tû’ may 
be used to argue for the lack of semantic reference of the term ‘totem animal’. 
It is enough to assume that affairs3 stands for the state of affairs in which x is a 
lion, or a tiger, or an albino animal, and affairs4 for the state of affairs in which 
worship by sacrifice is required towards x. Now, if one claims that the term 
‘totem animal’ should be understood as referring to affairs4 in the propositions 
(7)–(9), and as referring to affairs3 in the proposition (10), one would never 
be able to arrive at a conclusion that a particular lion, tiger, or an albino ani-
mal should be worshiped by sacrifice (due, of course, to the fallacy of quattuor 
terminorum); if, on the other hand, the semantic reference of ‘totem animal’ 
would be fixed as affairs3, the propositions (7)–(9) would become ‘analytically 
void’; and if the reference was affairs4, the proposition (10) would be ‘analyti-
cally void’.
This line of argument can be extended so as to include any predicate (and 
also a proper name, if one applies Quine’s procedure of translating proper names 
into predicates).4 Let us observe that Ross’s demonstration that a given concept 
has no semantic reference is made possible by simultaneously accepting two 
claims:
(a) a (partial) meaning postulate, such as “If a person x has eaten the food 
prepared for the chief, x is tû-tû”;
(b) a norm in which the term under consideration appears in the description 
of a state of affairs that triggers the application of the norm, as in “If a 
person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification.”
Assuming that one can always identify a (partial) meaning postulate for any 
term, the possibility of carrying out Ross’s argument to the effect that the term 
has no semantic reference hangs together with there being a norm in which the 
term appears in the description of a state of affairs that triggers the application 
of the norm. This is true also for the concepts, which – unlike ‘tû-tû’ or ‘totem 
animal’ – are used also in extra-legal, extra-moral and extra-religious contexts. 
Let us consider the term ‘food’; a partial meaning postulate for the term is, for 
example, “If x is a mango, then x is food”. Now, it suffices that there exists a so-
cial nom such as “If x is food, then x should be shared among the members of 
the community”, to arrive at a conclusion that ‘food’ has no semantic reference. 
(A note at the margin: the confusion inherent in Ross’s argument is clearly 
visible when one considers the epistemic status of the two kinds of propositions 
he contemplates in the ‘tû-tû’ example. Meaning postulates, such as “If a person 
x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is tû-tû”, are analytic statements 
in the sense that they are true in all possible worlds. Norms, on the other hand, 
such as “If a person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification”, are 
4 Cf. Quine 1948: 21–38.
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contingent, i.e. they hold only in some possible worlds. Due to space limitations 
I will not follow this line of critique; it seems, however, that Ross’s mistake lies 
in confusing the intension of a term with its extension).
Our considerations so far reveal that there is no logical difference between 
‘tû-tû’ and, potentially at least, any other predicate. Thus, Ross’s conclusion 
that such concepts as ‘tû-tû’, ‘obligation’, ‘ownership’ or ‘right’ lack semantic ref-
erence can easily be applied to any term. This is, of course, highly paradoxical. 
Ross nowhere suggests that his analysis undermines the concept of semantic 
reference altogether. To the contrary – he tries to show that while some terms 
(such as ‘chief ’, ‘food’ or ‘ceremony of purification’) have perfectly well defined 
referents, other concepts – ‘tû-tû’, ‘ownership’, etc. – are mere presentation de-
vices: they simplify the structure of the legal system, but carry no ontological 
baggage. 
This, ultimately, is Ross’s goal: he tries to establish a metaphysical claim to 
the effect that some legal concepts (‘ownership’, ‘right’ or ‘obligation’) do not 
refer to any existing entities. However, as we have seen, this cannot be done 
through mere logical means, since it is possible to show – in the same way – 
that any concept, which fulfills certain criteria (i.e., features in the description 
of a state of affairs which triggers the application of a legal norm), refers to no 
existing entity. In other words, the claim that some concepts have no semantic 
reference while others do, is pre-logical: it is determined by the chosen ontology. 
For example, Ross seems to assume that such concepts as ‘chief ’, ‘food’, ‘totem 
animal’ or ‘the ceremony of purification’ refer to something, while ‘tû-tû’ or ‘ob-
ligation’ do not. In light of this I believe that the best way to reconstruct Ross’s 
argument is to say that it aims at defending a certain ontological stance and runs 
roughly as follows: if you are an adherent of a purely naturalistic view of the law, 
you face a difficulty when considering some legal concepts such as ‘ownership’, 
‘obligation’ or ‘right’, since the way they are used in the legal discourse suggests 
that they refer to some existing phenomena. Ross’s analysis shows that one can 
avoid this unwanted conclusion – it is logically consistent to treat the afore-
mentioned concepts as devoid of semantic reference, while insisting on their 
usefulness in the structure of any legal system. Viewed from this angle, Ross’s 
argument is a defense of a certain metaphysical view of the law; it aims to show 
that such a metaphysics is possible, and not that it is the necessary way of look-
ing at legal phenomena.
3 What tû-tû can dO?
Ross admits that intermediate concepts – such as ‘tû-tû’ or ‘ownership’ – 
play a positive role in any legal system, since they enable a more efficient tech-
nique of the presentation of legal rules. I believe it is an understatement. Below, 
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I would like to show that Ross underestimates what tû-tû can do; I would even 
go as far as saying that it would be difficult to imagine a functional legal system 
without any intermediate concepts.
The first function of intermediate concepts is to increase coherence in the 
legal system. But what is coherence of a set of propositions? The measure in 
question is determined by taking into account: (a) whether the set is consist-
ent; (b) what is the level of inferential connections between the members of the 
set; and (c) what is the degree of the unification of the set.5 A set of proposition 
which is inconsistent is also incoherent. For any consistent set of propositions, 
its degree of coherence increases with the increase of the inferential connec-
tions between the propositions it contains and its level of unification. There 
exist inferential connections between propositions belonging to a given set if 
they can serve together as premises in logically valid schemes of inference. In 
turn, a given set of propositions is unified if it cannot be divided into two sub-
sets without a substantial loss of information. It is important to stress that the 
concept of logical coherence is not a binary one; coherence is rather a matter 
of degree. 
Let us come back now to our initial example. The set of propositions:
(1) If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is tû-tû.
(2) If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is tû-tû.
(3) If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is tû-tû.
(4) If a person x is tû-tû, x is subject to the ceremony of purification.
is coherent, since it is consistent. The degree of its coherence is determined by 
the fact that there exist inferential connections between its elements. (1) and 
(4), (2) and (4), as well as (3) and (4) may be used to derive three new propo-
sitions: “If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is subject to the 
ceremony of purification”, “If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is subject 
to the ceremony of purification”, and “If a person x has eaten the food prepared 
for the chief, x is subject to the ceremony of purification”. The set is also unified: 
if one divided it in any way (say, into two sets – {(1), (2)} and {(3), (4)}), one 
would lose some substantial information (i.e., it would no longer be possible to 
derive “If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is subject to the ceremony of 
purification”, and “If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is 
subject to the ceremony of purification”). 
Let us now compare our initial set with the following alternative, where the 
concept ‘tû-tû’ is eliminated:
(1)a If a person x has encountered their mother in law, x is s subject to the 
ceremony of purification.
5 Cf. Bonjour 1985, Brożek 2013.
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 (2)a If a person x has killed a totem animal, x is s subject to the ceremony of 
purification.
 (3)a If a person x has eaten the food prepared for the chief, x is s subject to 
the ceremony of purification.
The resulting set of propositions, even if smaller than the original one, is 
much less coherent. It is consistent, but there exist no inferential connections 
between its elements, and it is not unified – one can divide the set in a number 
of ways way without any loss of information.
But why coherence matters? An in-depth analysis of this problem exceeds 
the scope of this short note. However, it seems that the degree of coherence is 
closely correlated with a number of cognitive factors. Arguably, high degree of 
coherence enables us to better comprehend, learn and remember the given set 
of rules, and apply them in a more efficient way. A legal system which would be 
coherent only to a small degree would be dysfunctional, as illustrated by those 
historical legal systems which were highly casuistic.
The second role played by intermediate concepts is heuristic, and it may help 
increase the completeness of a legal system.6 Let us imagine that the council of 
elders of the Noît-cif tribe has to decide the fate of an individual who has killed 
an animal. It was not a totem animal, but a beast killed only once a year during a 
special ceremony and the only source of meat for the chief ’s diet. If the Noît-cif 
primitive legal system did not contain the intermediary concept of ‘tû-tû’, the 
council of elders would have to devise a completely new legal rule governing the 
case at hand; however, given the pivotal role of the concept of ‘tû-tû’ in the cases 
of killing a totem animal and eating the food prepared for the chief, the council 
would have some guidance in deciding the novel case and would probably ar-
rive at the conclusion that the individual who committed the killing should be 
subject to the ceremony of purification. 
Let us consider another example. According to Ross, ownership is only an 
intermediary concept, a link between some states of affairs and their legal con-
sequences. Let us assume that in some legal system there exist only rules per-
taining to the ownership of movable and immovable things, and the legisla-
tor must consider the introduction of a new set of rules regulating intellectual 
property. It is clear that the existing concept of ownership is useful in such an 
endeavor. The legislator does not have to devise a completely new system of 
norms for intellectual property, but instead works within the framework of the 
existing model of ownership, only adapting it to the peculiar character of the 
problem under consideration. In other words, introducing intellectual property 
into the existing framework of rules governing ownership is different than de-
signing a completely new legal institution. In the former case, the process may 
6 Cf. Lindahl 2003: 185–200, Ashley & Brüninghaus 2003: 153–162.
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be called adaptation – one takes advantage of existing solutions, justifications, 
and the entire body of legal knowledge that surrounds the concept of owner-
ship; in the latter case, however, intellectual property would be an institution 
built from scratch, an essentially novel set of rules with no background know-
ledge to guide the legislator in their endeavor. 
It should be clear from the above examples that intermediate legal concepts 
have more to offer than a helpful ‘form of presentation’ of legal rules – they 
perform an important heuristic function. Whenever one decides a hard case or 
considers regulating an as-yet unregulated sphere of social interactions, one is 
better off with ‘tû-tû’-like concepts than without them.7 
* * *
I believe that the above considerations support the conclusion that the pic-
ture of ‘tû-tû’ and other intermediary legal concepts as painted by Ross is a bad 
caricature. Such concepts are more useful than Ross imagines – they not only 
generate much coherence in a legal system, but can also serve as a heuristic tool 
whenever one faces a novel situation or a hard case. ‘Tû-tû’ and similar concepts 
are powerful tools which shape our legal systems.
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